Why Russia and China Do Not Fear the West

As the global balance of power shifts in the twenty-first century, Russia and China have grown increasingly confident in defying Western influence. Their assertive actions — from military brinkmanship to economic coercion — reflect a strategic calculation that the Western alliance is too divided, distracted, and risk-averse to mount a unified response. The result is a geopolitical landscape marked by escalating tension, diminishing deterrence, and a deepening sense that the post–Cold War order is unraveling.

The Erosion of Western Cohesion

For decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Western unity defined the international system. The transatlantic alliance, anchored by the United States and the European Union, possessed both economic dominance and military superiority. Today, that coherence has visibly weakened. Domestic political divisions within Europe and the United States have created hesitation in responding to Russian and Chinese provocations. Disagreements over sanctions, defense spending, and strategic priorities reveal the difficulty of aligning democracies with diverse interests and electoral cycles.

Russia and China recognize these internal fractures. They interpret Western self-doubt not as a passing trend but as a structural vulnerability — one that can be manipulated through persistent pressure and calibrated provocation. In Moscow’s view, time is on its side. In Beijing’s, the West’s moral authority and institutional strength are fading faster than its own capacity to expand influence.

Russia’s Military Posture on NATO’s Frontier

In Eastern Europe, Russian military activity has sharply intensified. Large-scale drills near NATO borders, frequent airspace violations, and the deployment of advanced missile systems in Kaliningrad and Belarus represent more than intimidation tactics; they are designed to normalize aggression as a strategic constant. The Baltic states and Poland have reported dozens of incursions into their air defense zones, testing both reaction time and alliance coordination.

Despite repeated warnings from NATO headquarters in Brussels, Western responses have remained measured. Reinforcements are symbolic rather than substantial, with rotational troops and joint exercises serving more as political gestures than as credible deterrents. Russia interprets this restraint as strategic uncertainty. Each instance of limited Western reaction strengthens Moscow’s belief that NATO’s mutual defense clause — the core of its deterrence doctrine — might not be invoked quickly or decisively.

Moscow’s hybrid warfare also complicates Western calculations. Cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and covert sabotage of energy and transportation networks are conducted below the threshold of open warfare. In Germany, Finland, and the Czech Republic, sabotage investigations have linked fires and explosions to suspected Russian operatives, but convictions remain rare. This “gray zone” aggression allows the Kremlin to advance its goals without crossing lines that would trigger full-scale confrontation.

China’s Parallel Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

While Russia threatens NATO’s eastern flank, China pursues parallel ambitions in Asia. Its sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, relentless military pressure on Taiwan, and expansion of maritime infrastructure challenge U.S. dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Yet Beijing’s moves are carefully calibrated — aggressive enough to reshape the regional status quo but not overtly belligerent enough to provoke war.

Naval encounters between the U.S. and Chinese vessels near disputed reefs illustrate this balance. Incidents come dangerously close to sparking armed clashes, but China’s economic leverage deters escalation. Many Western allies, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia, depend heavily on Chinese trade. Beijing exploits this dependency to temper criticism while advancing its strategic agenda through the Belt and Road Initiative, which extends its economic footprint from Southeast Asia to Eastern Europe.

China also deepens its partnership with Russia through joint military drills and coordinated diplomatic messaging. Their summer 2025 exercises off Alaska — involving bombers, naval destroyers, and surveillance aircraft — were a symbolic warning that both powers can project force near U.S. territory. Analysts see this cooperation as a modernized version of Cold War alignment, binding two authoritarian systems through shared opposition to Western dominance.

Historical Parallels and Strategic Differences

The current era evokes echoes of the Cold War but with key differences. Then, ideological competition was tempered by clear red lines and mutually assured destruction, ensuring a degree of predictability. Today’s confrontation operates in a murkier environment. Nuclear deterrence remains, but a new arena of competition — cyber warfare, information manipulation, and economic dependency — blurs boundaries between peace and conflict.

Russia and China employ asymmetric tactics that require no formal alliances or declarations of war. State-sponsored media and social networks amplify polarization in Western societies. Cyberattacks target infrastructure and election systems, not to destroy but to erode trust. By weaponizing ambiguity and exploiting democratic transparency, Moscow and Beijing achieve strategic effects disproportionate to their material costs.

These hybrid campaigns succeed because Western responses are slow and fragmented. Coordinating twenty-seven EU member states or multiple NATO parliaments takes time, whereas autocratic regimes act within hours. This structural asymmetry gives authoritarian powers a distinct advantage in the modern confrontation.

Economic Dimensions and Sanctions Fatigue

Economic interdependence remains both a shield and a sword. Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine have battered Moscow’s finances, yet the Russian economy has adapted by deepening trade with Asia, particularly China and India. Energy exports to non-Western markets have offset lost revenue from Europe, while domestic industries have substituted restricted imports with local production or Chinese alternatives.

Meanwhile, in Europe, high energy prices and inflation have eroded public support for harsh sanctions. Populist movements in Germany, Italy, and Hungary question the cost of prolonged economic war. This fatigue plays into Moscow’s hands, allowing it to exploit divisions between nations seeking energy stability and those prioritizing moral resistance.

For China, the balance is more subtle. Western governments depend on Chinese manufacturing for everything from electronics to pharmaceuticals. Efforts to “de-risk” supply chains are underway, but replacing Chinese sources takes years. This dependency discourages aggressive countermeasures, granting Beijing flexibility in advancing its political objectives while maintaining trade relationships.

The Transatlantic Challenge and NATO’s Response

Amid this evolving landscape, NATO faces its most complex test since its founding in 1949. The alliance’s credibility rests on its ability to deter aggression not only with rhetoric but with capability and speed. Secretary General Mark Rutte has emphasized the need for rapid force mobility, unified command structures, and increased defense spending across all member states. Some progress has been made: Poland, the Baltic nations, and the Nordic members have significantly ramped up military investment and preparedness.

Yet across Western Europe, sustaining political consensus remains difficult. Public opinion varies widely, with southern members focused on migration and economic growth, while eastern members prioritize security. Washington continues to shoulder the largest share of defense responsibilities, even as it grapples with commitments in the Indo-Pacific. This imbalance reinforces Russia’s perception that NATO’s deterrence posture is overstretched.

Strategic Implications for the Global Order

The consequences of Western hesitation reach far beyond Europe and Asia. Countries in the Global South observe Moscow and Beijing’s defiance as evidence that alternative power centers can thrive outside Western frameworks. In Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, partnerships with Russia and China offer political backing and economic investment without conditions tied to democratic governance or human rights.

The erosion of Western confidence therefore has an ideological dimension. The liberal order — once synonymous with stability and prosperity — now appears fragile amid internal divisions and external challenges. Russia and China leverage this perception to expand influence through narratives of sovereignty, resistance, and multipolarity. Their message resonates in regions skeptical of Western interventionism and economic dominance.

Can the West Regain Its Resolve?

The question looming over policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and London is whether the West can restore deterrence before miscalculation leads to crisis. Experts argue that deterrence requires more than military might; it depends on political unity, swift decision-making, and credible long-term strategy. Both Russia and China understand that Western alliances, while powerful, can be paralyzed by debate. Their confidence grows not solely from their strength but from their perception of Western uncertainty.

Reinvigorating Western resolve will require hard choices — boosting defense budgets, restructuring energy dependencies, and repairing domestic trust in institutions. Without these foundations, symbolic declarations will continue to fall short against opponents who exploit every hesitation.

As Russia and China test the limits of Western restraint, the geopolitical stakes rise with each provocation. Whether through military maneuvers near NATO borders or naval patrols in contested Asian waters, their objective remains constant: to reshape a world once defined by Western primacy into one governed by competing centers of power. The coming years will determine whether the West can adapt to this reality — or whether history will record this period as the moment when deterrence ceased to deter.