Europe’s ‘Bonsai Armies’: Commissioner Warns of Deep Dependence on U.S. Military Power

A Call for Urgent European Defense Reform

European Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has issued a sharp warning about Europe's defense fragility, cautioning that the continent’s military power remains deeply dependent on the United States. Speaking in a televised interview with a snowy European cityscape behind him, Kubilius described the region’s collective defense structure as “27 bonsai armies” — miniature versions of what a true integrated military force should be. His remarks have reignited the debate over Europe's capacity to defend itself in the absence of American military support, a concern that is becoming increasingly pressing amid shifting global dynamics and uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy.

Kubilius’s message was blunt: without a unified and self-reliant defense architecture, Europe could face severe strategic limitations in confronting security threats from both near and far. “How would Europe replace 100,000 U.S. troops if they suddenly withdrew?” he asked, pointing to the U.S. military presence that continues to anchor NATO’s deterrence posture in Europe.

The Historical Roots of Dependence

Europe’s postwar security model has long hinged on transatlantic cooperation. After World War II, the continent’s devastated economies and fractured political systems left them unable to sustain large standing armies. The creation of NATO in 1949 effectively outsourced continental defense to American leadership and logistics. While this arrangement enabled European reconstruction through the Marshall Plan and decades of stability under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it also discouraged full military independence.

Even after the Cold War ended, most European countries maintained modest defense spending levels, choosing to invest in economic growth and social welfare instead of weapons systems. The assumption that the U.S. would always guarantee European security persisted — an assumption Kubilius now suggests may no longer hold.

Over the decades, periodic calls for greater European defense autonomy surfaced in political speeches and white papers. French President Charles de Gaulle, for instance, withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command in 1966 to assert independence. And in more recent years, discussions around a “European army” have gained traction within EU institutions. Yet, progress has been halting, hindered by national politics, divergent strategic priorities, and varying levels of military capability among member states.

The Fragile Architecture of Fragmented Armies

Kubilius’s “bonsai army” analogy touches on a structural flaw at the heart of Europe’s defense posture: fragmentation. Each EU member state maintains its own defense policy, command structure, procurement system, and strategic doctrines. This creates a multitude of small, semi-compatible forces rather than a cohesive continental defense system.

For example, while Germany, France, and Italy field technologically advanced systems, smaller nations often lack the logistics or personnel to operate effectively outside their borders. And despite decades of talk about interoperability, differences in equipment — from fighter jets to communication systems — continue to restrict coordination during joint operations.

The European Defense Agency and initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) were designed to address these gaps by promoting collaboration in procurement and research. However, critics argue that results have been incremental and uneven, with few major joint defense projects reaching full operational maturity.

The Strategic Context: A Shifting Global Landscape

Kubilius’s warning comes at a time of mounting strategic uncertainty. Global instability has intensified, from renewed conflict in Eastern Europe to growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. Simultaneously, the United States has signaled an increasing focus on global competition with China, potentially diverting attention and resources away from Europe.

In recent years, questions about the reliability of U.S. commitments under Article 5 of the NATO treaty have unsettled European capitals. Political fluctuations in Washington, along with domestic debates about defense spending, have raised concerns that the U.S. might eventually scale back its presence and financial contribution to NATO. Currently, about 100,000 American troops are stationed in Europe, forming the backbone of the alliance’s conventional deterrence.

Should those forces withdraw or redeploy, Europe would face not only logistical challenges but also a profound strategic vacuum. NATO’s integrated command relies heavily on American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as transport, air refueling, and missile defense capabilities — areas where Europe remains comparatively weak.

The Economic Challenge of Defense Independence

Building an autonomous European defense capability would require a dramatic reallocation of resources. While NATO members agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense, only a subset of European nations consistently meet that target. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, has pledged to reach that benchmark through its “Zeitenwende” defense initiative launched in 2022, but progress has been slow due to bureaucratic bottlenecks and procurement issues.

Estimates suggest that achieving a truly independent European deterrent force could demand hundreds of billions of euros in additional annual spending — on par with the defense budgets of the United States and China. This scale of investment would put pressure on already strained public finances across many EU states.

Nevertheless, advocates argue that the economic benefits could offset some of the costs. A stronger European defense industry would stimulate innovation, create skilled jobs, and reduce dependency on non-European suppliers. According to defense analysts, greater cooperation on research and production could also increase efficiency by ending the duplication of efforts across 27 national markets.

Lessons from Regional Comparisons

To understand Europe’s defense dilemma, it is instructive to compare it with regions that possess integrated or centralized military structures. The United States, for instance, maintains a single unified command system that coordinates land, air, naval, space, and cyber operations through joint commands. Similarly, China’s People’s Liberation Army operates under a consolidated Central Military Commission, enabling rapid strategic decision-making and resource allocation.

By contrast, Europe’s defense apparatus resembles a patchwork of miniaturized forces, each with its own priorities. The European Union’s attempts to create joint battlegroups — multinational units meant to respond rapidly to crises — have repeatedly faltered due to political disagreements over deployment authority and funding. As a result, no EU battlegroup has ever been deployed in an actual operation.

Even within NATO, burden-sharing remains uneven. The United Kingdom and France provide most of the continent’s nuclear deterrence, while Eastern European states rely heavily on U.S. support for intelligence and logistics. This imbalance perpetuates a cycle in which some countries underinvest, expecting others to compensate for their shortfall.

Building Toward Strategic Autonomy

Efforts to strengthen European defense integration have regained momentum in recent years, spurred by external pressures. Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine has underscored the urgency of bolstering Europe’s conventional military forces and ammunition production. Meanwhile, initiatives such as the European Peace Facility and the European Defence Fund aim to finance weapons production, joint research, and training.

Advocates of strategic autonomy argue that the objective is not to replace NATO but to strengthen Europe’s contribution within it — ensuring the alliance remains balanced and resilient even if U.S. involvement fluctuates. Kubilius echoed this sentiment by emphasizing that European security must be rooted in self-confidence and collective capability rather than dependence.

However, the political path toward that goal remains complex. National governments continue to guard their sovereignty over defense decisions, and public opinion varies widely from one country to another. While some populations favor increased military investment, others remain wary of militarization, preferring diplomacy and development aid as tools of stability.

The Road Ahead for European Defense

Kubilius’s metaphor of “bonsai armies” captures both the scale of Europe’s challenge and the potential for growth. Like bonsai trees — carefully managed but artificially constrained — Europe’s militaries reflect decades of peace and political caution. Transforming them into robust, mission-ready forces will require not just money but a cultural shift toward shared responsibility.

Analysts suggest that the first step lies in consolidating defense planning at the European level, harmonizing procurement standards, and coordinating logistics more effectively. Clearer governance mechanisms could also enable faster decision-making during crises. Crucially, defense cooperation would have to extend beyond hardware to include shared intelligence, cybersecurity, and space surveillance — domains that define modern warfare as much as tanks or aircraft.

Despite the obstacles, momentum appears to be building. Recent European Council meetings have prioritized defense coordination, and several member states have announced record increases in their defense budgets. Whether these commitments translate into a fundamentally stronger and more unified military posture remains to be seen.

For now, Kubilius’s remarks serve as both a wake-up call and a roadmap. As the strategic balance of the 21st century continues to shift, Europe faces a defining choice: remain reliant on a transatlantic shield that may no longer be guaranteed, or cultivate the full-scale defense capacity required to stand on its own.