China Boosts Global Security Ties with Surveillance Tech and Training Exports

Beijing, November 14, 2025 – China is extending its influence over global security networks through the export of advanced surveillance technologies and police training programs, presenting itself as a partner in maintaining international stability while redefining the norms of global law enforcement cooperation. The growing reach of Chinese security aid is reshaping how governments address domestic unrest, cyber threats, and cross-border crime, as Beijing accelerates its Global Security Initiative.

The Global Security Initiative and Its Expansion

Under President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), launched in 2022, China advocates an international order grounded in respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and collective security. The initiative contrasts sharply with what Beijing terms Western-dominated security models, framing its approach as cooperative rather than confrontational.

The GSI has spawned a series of platforms to promote collaboration, chief among them the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum, attended by delegates from more than 120 countries in 2025. The forum serves as a hub for sharing technology and expertise, showcasing breakthroughs such as artificial intelligence-based surveillance systems, crowd-control robotics, and predictive policing algorithms.

One of the most discussed outcomes of the forum was China’s Global Public Security Index, which ranked nations by criteria including counter-terrorism success, crime reduction, and cyber defense. China positioned itself among the top-tier performers, citing advances in big data-driven policing and low civilian gun crime as indicators of security efficiency.

The Surveillance Industry Goes Global

Chinese technology companies have become major suppliers of surveillance infrastructure worldwide. Hikvision and Dahua, two state-linked camera manufacturers, now control nearly 40 percent of the global camera market. Their products are staples of citywide monitoring systems, border control points, and transportation hubs on nearly every continent.

Telecommunications giant Huawei has installed its Safe City systems in over 100 countries, creating integrated networks that monitor crime, manage traffic, and track emergencies in real time. While marketed as solutions for improving urban safety, critics argue these systems also enable extensive state surveillance and censorship.

Emerging Chinese firms such as Geedge Networks have broadened the portfolio, providing deep-packet inspection and internet filtering tools. Governments in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan have deployed these systems to manage online content and track digital communication. Analysts note that such technologies appeal to states facing domestic unrest or ethnic tensions, offering both control and order under the guise of modernization.

Exporting Law Enforcement Training

Parallel to its technology exports, China has built a global training network that has evolved into a cornerstone of its security diplomacy. Since 2000, nearly 900 police and security training programs have been conducted for officials from 138 countries, according to research by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In 2010, China hosted just 14 such sessions. By 2019, that number had surged to 138, and the trajectory continues upward. The courses—held in police academies across cities such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai—cover a broad array of subjects: anti-terrorism operations, border management, infrastructure protection, and digital policing.

The curriculum combines technical lessons with elements of Chinese culture and governance. Participants often practice tai chi, visit national security museums, and study selections from Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China, an ideological text emphasizing discipline and unity in public administration.

Regional Focus and Participation Trends

China’s outreach has found enthusiastic audiences across Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Central Asian governments, confronting jihadist threats and regional instability, prioritize counter-terrorism courses. In Southeast Asia, law enforcement agencies focus on anti-fraud and anti-trafficking modules. African states, where China has vast infrastructure investments, emphasize programs that protect railways, ports, and power plants built under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Data from policy researchers reveal that 82 percent of authoritarian states, 86 percent of hybrid regimes, and 75 percent of flawed democracies have engaged with Chinese training, compared to only one-third of full democracies—and mainly in limited, language-specific exchanges.

The high proportion of participation from states with constrained political freedoms reflects Beijing’s appeal as a non-judgmental partner. While Western institutions often attach human rights or governance conditions to security assistance, China’s training packages come with no explicit political requirements. This diplomatic neutrality makes them attractive to governments wary of Western scrutiny.

Case Studies: From Serbia to the Pacific

One of the most visible examples of Chinese security cooperation is Serbia, where joint patrols between Chinese and Serbian police operate in Belgrade’s commercial districts. The collaboration began in 2019 and expanded through 2025 as Chinese tourism to Serbia grew and bilateral relations strengthened. Surveys show 81 percent of Serbians hold favorable opinions of China, seeing the partnership as a sign of trust.

Yet tensions have emerged. Following the partial collapse of a Chinese-built railway earlier this year, citizens took to the streets in protest against alleged mismanagement. Activists claim that Serbian authorities deployed Chinese surveillance cameras, installed under the Safe City project, to track demonstrators. While officials denied the allegations, rights organizations argue the system’s design allows authorities to identify individuals in real time.

In Kazakhstan, unrest following the 2022 fuel protests spurred the installation of thousands of new Chinese cameras in Almaty. The technology, modeled after systems used in Xinjiang, reportedly flagged activists at border checkpoints through facial recognition algorithms. In Ethiopia, similar equipment has been linked to heightened state monitoring amid ethnic violence and insurgency.

The Pacific region is also feeling the effects. The Solomon Islands, which expanded policing cooperation with China in 2023, now emphasizes internal stability and crowd management as training priorities. Observers in neighboring Australia and New Zealand have expressed concern that the shift tilts regional policing toward centralized control rather than community engagement, prompting both nations to propose counter-initiatives involving transparency and community policing programs.

Comparing Global Security Models

China’s growing role in global law enforcement reflects a broader reconfiguration of international security partnerships. Western-led programs such as the U.S. International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)—which have trained over 70,000 officers since 1995 with a focus on democratic policing and rule of law—face slowed funding and reduced geographic reach.

In contrast, China provides a “pragmatic alternative”—offering equipment, training, and financing without ideological lectures. This approach fills a vacuum left by Western retrenchment and appeals to developing nations balancing domestic challenges with geopolitical pressure.

Experts caution that the results depend heavily on local context. “Chinese security exports don’t create repression by themselves,” says Sheena Greitens of the University of Texas. “But in states without legal safeguards or strong civil institutions, these tools can easily be used to consolidate authoritarian power.”

That distinction explains why democratic partners that import Chinese systems—such as the Philippines or the United Arab Emirates—use them differently than more restrictive governments in Myanmar or Guinea. In the former, oversight mechanisms and press scrutiny can reduce misuse. In the latter, surveillance infrastructure reinforces already expansive domestic control.

The Technology Behind the Influence

The technologies exported under the Global Security Initiative go far beyond traditional CCTV. Advanced AI analytics identify suspicious behaviors, cross-reference personal data, and predict potential incidents. Law enforcement agencies in Africa and Latin America have begun integrating Chinese-built databases that combine biometric information with social indicators such as travel history or online activity.

This expanded ecosystem, supported by Chinese loans and technical partnerships, gives Beijing a dual advantage: diplomatic goodwill and potential access to global data flows. For recipient countries, it promises modernization at relatively low cost—though often at the expense of privacy and local sovereignty.

Independent cybersecurity researchers have pointed out that many systems rely on Chinese cloud infrastructure, enabling remote troubleshooting but also raising questions about external data access. Beijing denies any intent to misuse data, emphasizing contractual compliance and mutual benefit.

The Economic and Strategic Impact

Economically, security exports have become a growing segment of China’s digital economy. According to trade analysts, surveillance equipment and associated software now comprise a multi-billion-dollar global industry, contributing billions annually to China’s export revenue.

Beyond profit, security exports serve as instruments of geopolitical influence. By building technological dependencies—where local police rely on Chinese hardware, software, and maintenance—Beijing extends its soft power in ways that traditional military alliances cannot achieve. This mirrors its approach with telecommunications infrastructure through Huawei and marine logistics via COSCO.

In developing regions, the influx of affordable Chinese technology can transform public safety outcomes. African cities such as Nairobi and Addis Ababa report reductions in petty crime and faster emergency response times following system installation. However, rights groups counter that these gains often come with increased state surveillance and diminished privacy protections.

Toward a Fragmented Global Order

As security partnerships become more diversified, nations increasingly blend influences. Countries like Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates leverage Chinese policing technology while maintaining defense cooperation with the United States. The outcome is a hybrid global order, defined less by ideology and more by pragmatic security needs.

Yet as technological capabilities spread faster than accountability standards, the world risks deepening divides between states that use these systems transparently and those that weaponize them for control. Analysts warn of a widening gap in digital governance, where surveillance norms differ almost as starkly as political systems themselves.

While China promotes its strategy as a stabilizing force for a turbulent century, critics argue that its model, intentionally or not, empowers regimes to suppress dissent. Whether framed as cooperation or control, the reality is that Beijing’s security exports have become a powerful global lever—reshaping how nations see security, sovereignty, and the boundaries of privacy in the modern age.