Supreme Court Justice Compares Voting Access Challenges for Black Americans to Disability Accommodations

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A Fresh Analogy in a High-Stakes Voting Rights Case

WASHINGTON — A provocative comparison emerged during Supreme Court arguments this week as one justice likened barriers Black Americans face in voting access to the structural and societal barriers faced by people with disabilities before the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Her comments came in a case examining whether South Carolina’s electoral map unlawfully dilutes the power of Black voters through racial gerrymandering.

Drawing an analogy between two landmark pieces of civil rights legislation—the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 and the ADA of 1990—the justice suggested that both laws share a common logic: to remedy conditions that deny equal participation, even where discriminatory intent may not be explicitly proven.

“Remedial action absent discriminatory intent is not new in civil rights laws,” she said during the arguments. “Congress recognized that structural barriers can create unequal access, and that’s true both in physical spaces and in democratic processes.”

Her remarks instantly drew national attention, signaling a potential shift in how the Court conceptualizes the scope of the VRA’s protections amid continuing disputes over race, representation, and the future of federal voting rights enforcement.

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The Core of the South Carolina Case

At the heart of the case is whether South Carolina’s congressional map—approved after the 2020 Census—constitutes racial gerrymandering by moving thousands of Black voters out of a competitive district to secure safer Republican majorities. A lower court found that lawmakers had relied heavily on race in drawing the new boundaries, an act the state argued was politically, not racially, motivated.

The Supreme Court initially heard arguments in March 2025 but took the rare step of reordering the case for additional questioning this fall, underscoring the complexity and potential national significance of its outcome. The ruling could reshape how states across the country draw district lines and interpret the balance between racial equity and political autonomy in redistricting.

South Carolina officials maintain that they acted within constitutional bounds, citing precedent allowing for partisan considerations as long as race is not the predominant factor. Civil rights advocates counter that such reasoning masks the enduring impact of racial polarization in voting, where Black voters remain politically cohesive but consistently marginalized.

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The ADA Comparison: Historical Context and Implications

By invoking the Americans with Disabilities Act, the justice reframed the debate around the purpose of remedial legislation itself. The ADA, enacted in 1990, mandated that public and private facilities ensure accessibility for people with disabilities, regardless of the builder’s intent. Lawmakers recognized that the obstacles were often structural, not intentional—but nonetheless deeply exclusionary.

Similarly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 addressed structural barriers like poll taxes, literacy tests, and racial gerrymandering that effectively denied African Americans the right to vote despite facially neutral laws. Section 2 of the VRA, which is at issue in this case, prohibits voting practices that result in discrimination “on account of race or color,” regardless of intent.

The justice explained that both statutes embody Congress’s authority to correct systemic inequities rooted in history. “Just as Congress in the ADA required physical spaces to be accessible, the VRA requires political structures to be equally open to participation,” she said.

Legal scholars have long debated whether Section 2 should focus solely on intent or also encompass outcomes that perpetuate racial disadvantage. The ADA analogy, some analysts suggest, could broaden judicial understanding of “equal access” beyond deliberate discrimination to include enduring structural barriers.

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Echoes of Allen v. Milligan

During arguments, the justice referenced the Court’s 2023 decision in Allen v. Milligan, which upheld a lower court’s ruling that Alabama’s congressional map likely violated Section 2 of the VRA. In that case, the Court affirmed the need to create a second majority-Black district, emphasizing that the state’s configuration “disabled” fair participation from minority voters.

That language—“disabled”—appears to have informed the justice’s current line of questioning, weaving together concepts from disability law and voting rights doctrine. By using the term, the Court in Milligan underscored that certain political processes, while appearing neutral, can be functionally inaccessible to minority voters because of entrenched social and structural dynamics.

If that logic carries through in the South Carolina dispute, the justices could reaffirm the principle that results-based discrimination analysis remains vital under Section 2, even decades after the VRA’s passage.

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The Broader Historical Context of Voting Access

For much of American history, Black citizens in the South have faced systemic obstacles to full participation in the democratic process. Even after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which prohibited racial discrimination in voting, states employed a host of measures—literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and racial intimidation—to suppress Black turnout.

The Voting Rights Act was designed as a corrective to these injustices, restoring federal oversight of states with histories of discrimination. However, the Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder effectively nullified the VRA’s preclearance formula, allowing states to change voting laws without prior federal approval. Since then, litigation under Section 2 has become the main avenue for challenging discriminatory maps and voting practices.

In that legal vacuum, questions about the standard of proof—intent versus effect—have drawn increasing scrutiny. The justice’s analogy to the ADA signals that the Court may be revisiting whether equal access should be judged by outcomes rather than motives, a view echoing the broader civil rights tradition of affirmative equity measures.

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National and Regional Reactions

The justice’s comments reverberated across legal and political circles. Civil rights advocates hailed the statement as a clear acknowledgment that equality often requires proactive steps to dismantle systemic disadvantage. Disability rights groups, too, applauded the parallel, noting that both movements share roots in the fight for accessibility—whether physical or civic.

In South Carolina, reactions were mixed. Voting rights organizations argued that the justice’s remarks validated their position that “structural exclusion” persists in redistricting practices across the South. State officials countered that the analogy blurred distinctions between physical access and political competition, insisting that their redistricting process relied on traditional political metrics, not race.

Elsewhere in the region, officials in neighboring states such as Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama are closely monitoring the case. Each faces ongoing litigation over districting and minority representation. A ruling against South Carolina could compel legislatures across the South to redraw maps and could strengthen future challenges under Section 2.

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Economic and Democratic Consequences

Beyond the legal realm, the case carries potential economic and civic implications. Political representation influences federal funding, infrastructure investments, and policy priorities that directly affect local economies. When communities lose electoral influence, disparities in public resources often widen.

Studies by nonpartisan policy institutes show that equitable representation correlates with stronger economic growth, improved access to healthcare, and greater educational equity. Conversely, regions with diluted minority representation often experience slower development and reduced voter engagement. Legal experts say that upholding a broad interpretation of Section 2 could sustain more inclusive policymaking, benefiting both minority communities and the broader electorate.

The justice’s analogy to disability access emphasizes not just fairness but also functionality—suggesting that democracy, like public infrastructure, must be structured to accommodate all participants. If voting systems remain “inaccessible” to significant portions of the population, the democratic process itself loses legitimacy.

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What Comes Next

The Supreme Court’s decision, expected later this term, will likely clarify the contours of racial gerrymandering and the reach of Section 2. A ruling that affirms the need for outcome-based remedies could strengthen civil rights protections nationwide, reaffirming the federal government’s responsibility to ensure equitable participation in the electoral process.

If, however, the Court narrows the interpretation of Section 2 to require proof of discriminatory intent, voting rights advocates warn that it could severely limit future challenges and open the door for more aggressive partisan map-drawing practices.

For now, the justice’s comparison between the ADA and VRA stands as one of the most striking ideas to surface in years of voting rights litigation—linking two foundational movements for accessibility under a shared vision of equality.

As the nation awaits the ruling, the broader question remains whether the Court will see democracy itself as a system requiring accommodation for all—just as public spaces have, by law, been made open to every citizen.